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Incomplete process hazard analysis (PHA) and poor knowledge management have 
been two major reasons that have caused numerous lamentable disasters in the 
chemical process industry. To improve the safety integrity of a process system, all 
risk should be reduced to a tolerable limit. One way of doing it is by adding layers of 
protection which include inherent safer design, basic process control system (BPCS), 
alarms, SIS, physical protection, and emergency response procedure. These layers 
however, are cost to the process industry in term of implementing it as well as 
maintaining the quality of the layers. Therefore, understanding the required safety 
integrity level (SIL) of a process is essential in order to meet the tolerable risk target 
as well as to optimise the cost of a safety system. Meanwhile, layer of protection 
analysis (LOPA) is a simplified approach to verify SIL of a process system. 
Nevertheless, the method is relatively new and various modifications have take place 
by different entities. Therefore, there is a need to maintain the consistency of the 
LOPA result by adhering to a standard procedure and practise as well as clear 
direction provided by Centre of Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). This can be done 
easier by developing a framework for LOPA analyst to follows as well as tailored to 
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1.1. Background of Study 
 
Safety analysis is very important in industry especially in process industry. Safety 
analysis is basically a process where the source of risk that may cause harm to 
human, damage of property and degradation of environment are analysed, managed 
and sufficiently reduced by focusing on all the related safety lifecycle stages 
including the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance through to 
decommissioning. The minimisation of the risk to a tolerable limit is usually 
achieved by combination of safety protective systems including basic control process 
system, safety instrumented system (SIS), safety technology and external risk 
reduction facilities. 
 
Among these safety protective layers, SIS manages to draw a lot of people interest 
for the implementation of safety analysis. SIS represents an integral part of a safety 
management system in order to reduce the risk of major accident hazards. In the 
1990s the standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 emerged to provide the required 
action to be achieved by SIS and the required probability of failure on demand 
(PFD). Following the standard, layer of protection analysis (LOPA) was developed 
to provide guideline for companies to comply with a consistence manner. As a result, 
the first guideline book for LOPA was published in 2001. By 2009, it is likely more 
than 1 million LOPA have been performed. During the same period, many abuses of 
LOPA have been noted and several innovations have occurred (Bridges, 2009). Due 
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to this finding, many research have been conduct to develop the best method in 
implementing LOPA (Lassen, 2008). 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
 
 A few recent studies has been made to verify safety integrity level (SIL) of safety 
instrumented system (SIS) using layer of protection analysis (LOPA) (Lassen 2008, 
Zatil 2009, Fakhirin 2010, Cui et. Al 2012). However, besides LOPA other methods 
in determining SIL are available in industry. The methods include quantitative and 
qualitative analysis to verify SIL of SIS. While quantitative analysis easily gives 
numerical value to SIL, qualitative method will not do the same and require expert 
judgement to participate in resulting analysis. Meanwhile, LOPA is a semi-
quantitative method using numerical categories to estimate the parameters needed to 
calculate the necessary risk reduction which corresponds to the acceptance criteria 
(CCPS, 2001). These categories are evaluated differently by different entity due 
different in geological and social acceptance. In brief, LOPA has been widely used 
but the implementation differs from one plant to another. As a result, the 
implementation seems to be difficult and the data obtained is inconsistent. A clear 
example of this inconsistency can be seen in a review of LOPA analyses of overfill 
of fuel storage tanks, “Buncefield incident” where seven consultants are required to  
produce LOPA report and difference between results are analysed (Health and Safety 
Executive, 2009). Thus, a simulation of LOPA analysis must be developed to give an 
overview on the whole analysis for a better understanding of LOPA for safety 
personal. 
 
1.3. Objective  
 
The objectives of this study are listed as follows:  
 To develop a tool for conduct of LOPA to verify SIL of SIS 





1.4. Scope of Study 
 
 This paper will analyse the application of LOPA in determining SIL of 
instrumented system. The project will start by defining a few key terms which is 
Safety Integrity Level, Safety Instrumented System, and Layer of Protection 
Analysis. Development of framework or procedure of implementing LOPA will not 
be covered in this project, instead review on available procedures in industry will be 
made and simple implementation procedure will be extract. The project will 
emphasize more on case study already evaluated in industry using the tool developed 
and compare the resulting recommendation with current evaluation as well as some 
comparison with the method used in the current evaluation.  
 
1.5. The Relevancy of the Project 
 
The purpose is this project is to demonstrate method of analysing the Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) of a system using Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) by a worksheet. 
Although LOPA is widely known to be able to evaluate safety integrity level, 
application in Malaysia is limited and the knowledge in implementing the LOPA 
procedures varies. Hence the procedures would be demonstrated in a simple way to 
be easily understood. 
 
1.6. Feasibility of the Project within the Scope and Time frame 
 
This project will start by collecting the reading material such as the books, journals, 
related website, thorough discussion with supervisor and collaboration from 
industrial practitioners. At the end of Final Year Project (FYP) 1, it is expected that 
the literature survey on LOPA have been carried out and understood. Meanwhile, for 
Final Year Project (FYP) 2, the study will focus on implementing the approach by 








2.1. Important Definitions 
 
2.1.1.  Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is a concept introduced during the development of BS 
EN 61508 (BSI 2002) as a measure of the quality or dependability of a system which 
has a safety function (Gulland, 2004). The concept is to measure the confidence level 
of which the system is expected to perform its function successfully. Following its 
definition, the concept is the being used in BS IEC 61511 (BSI 2003) which is the 
process sector specific application of BS EN 61508. The standard recognises that 
safety function can be categorised into low demand rate safety function and high 
demand rate safety function. Table 2.1 shows the PFD ranges and associated risk 
reduction factor (RRF) ranges that correspond to each SIL. 
 
Table 2.1: PFD ranges and associated risk reduction factor (RRF) ranges that 
correspond to each SIL (CCPS, 2001) 




















 10 - 100 
 
As observed from the relationship between safety integrity level, probability of 
failure on demand and risk reduction factor in Table 2.1, higher level of SIL indicate 




2.1.2. Safety Instrumented System (SIS) 
 
SIS is made up of one or more safety instrumented functions (SIF) to sense abnormal 
situations and automatically return the process to a safe state. This is usually 
achieved by performing partial or complete shutdown of the process, to prevent a 
hazardous event or to mitigate its consequences. If the initial risk of a process is high, 
the availability and integrity requirements for SIF‟s must be high. Requirements for 
SIF‟s are addressed in IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 which are widely accepted as the 
basis for specification, design, and operation of SIS‟s. Each SIF is specified in terms 
of the action to be achieved and the required safety integrity level (SIL) for the SIF. 
 
2.1.3. Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 
 
LOPA is an engineering tool used to ensure that process risk is successfully 
mitigated to an accepTable level (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2001). LOPA 
is basically a systematic methodology developed to allow fast, cost effective means 
of analysis to identify the independent protective layers (IPLs) that reduce the 
frequency and consequence of specific hazardous incidents. LOPA provides specific 
criteria and restrictions for the evaluation of IPLs, eliminating the subjectivity of 
qualitative methods at substantially less cost than fully quantitative techniques. 
LOPA can be used at any point in the lifecycle of a project or process, but it is most 
cost effective when implemented during front-end loading when process flow 
diagrams are complete and the P&IDs are under development. For existing 
processes, LOPA should be used during or after the HAZOP review or revalidation. 
LOPA is typically applied after qualitative hazards analysis has been completed, 
which provides the LOPA team with a listing of hazard scenarios with associated 
consequence description and potential safeguards for consideration. A LOPA 
program is most successful when a procedure is developed that sets the criteria for 
when LOPA is used and who is qualified to use it. A well-written procedure will also 
incorporate criteria for evaluation of initiating cause frequency and IPL probability to 
fail on demand (PFD). The development of these criteria takes time, but this cost is 




2.2. Assigning Safety Integrity Level 
 
LOPA is not the only method in determining safety integrity level for instrumented 
system. Various other methods, both quantitatively and qualitatively are available in 
industry. In qualitative methods expert judgement is always required and the 
resulting end result is highly subjective. Meanwhile, quantitative methods provide 
numerical result and more consistent target for analysis. The methods that will be 
applied are different depending on the policy of the company or organisation on 
whether the necessary risk reduction is needed to be specified in a numerical manner 
or qualitative manner. Often, big scale process plant requires the assigning of the 
safety integrity level to be made quantitatively in order to identify basis of decision 
in later stage of selecting appropriate protective layers. Among the methods available 
include quantitative method in IEC 61511, the risk matrix, the safety layer matrix, 
the OLF 070 guideline, the risk graph and the calibrated risk graph. 
 
2.3. LOPA Procedures 
 
Over the wide time range of LOPA application, many approaches and methodologies 
have been presented. Dowell (1998), Summers (2003) and Ellis and Wharton (2006) 
have presented flowchart while IEC 61511 use a worksheet as the basis. On the hand, 
CCPS (2001) provide a step by step procedures which detailed explanation presented 
by chapters in the book. Some companies established their own procedures such as 
BP (2006) and Aker E&T (Nordhagen, 2007). 
 
The essential steps that seem common are (Lassen, 2008): 
 
 Documentation of the hazard analysis 
 Development of scenario or impact event 
 Identification of initiating causes 
 Determination of the protection layers including the IPLs 
 Quantification (cause frequency / likelihood and PFD) 





From various procedures analysed, Lassen provide a preferred method which 







Develop and document risk acceptance criteria 
Gather and document data 
Further hazard identification 
and analysis 
Transform data 
Select impact event 
Screen impact even (by consequence) 
Identify initiating causes 
Determine frequencies of initiating causes 
Select initiating cause-impact event pair 
Identify IPLs and determine PFDs 
Calculate intermediate event likelihood 
Sufficient data? 
Next initiating cause event pair 
Sum up the intermediate event likelihood 
Determine SIL 
 
Target risk satisfied? 
SIL > 2? 











C < CC 







This project is mainly to develop an application that would utilise layer of protection 
analysis (LOPA) method to verify the safety integrity level of instrumented system. 
The development of this application has been done using the Microsoft Excel 2007. 
 
3.1. Selected Procedure in Implementing LOPA 
 
As mentioned earlier in section 1.4, the project will not cover the whole procedure in 
implementing LOPA for the development of this tool. Instead, the core concept to 
run LOPA will be extracted from established procedures as describe in section 2.3. 
From all the procedures or approaches available, common steps and its quantitative 
method as suggested by Lassen is summarise as follow: 
 
 Identify a hazardous event and assess its severity 
 Identify initiating event and assess its frequency 
 Identify the applicable independent protection layers and evaluate its 
effectiveness 
 Calculate the expected frequency for the hazardous event 
 Determine the need for additional layers of protection and the required SIL if 





3.1.1. Identify a hazardous event and assess its severity 
 
The first mehod in applying LOPA is to identify the hazardous event under 
investigation and categorise the severity. From this identification, a numerical value 
must be able to be assigned (based on its severity) as the input for the tool and will 
be the basic principle for the calculation procedure later on. Often, this value will 
vary but not far from the established threshold frequency numbers for consequence 
category published by Centre for Chemical Process Safety Guideline as in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Threshold frequency number for each consequence category (CCPS, 
2001) 
Consequence severity Max. accepTable frequency Threshold Frequency Index, 
Ft 
Category 5 – Catastrophic 1/10000 3 
Category 4 – Major 1/1000 4 
Category 3 – Critical 1/100 5 
Category 2 – Minor 1/10 6 
Category 1 – Negligible 1 7 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Scenario and severity input 
 
Figure 3.1 represent the extracted information from the proposed tool where 





3.1.2. Identify Initiating event and access its frequency 
 
The second input data will be the the frequency of the intiating event that leads to the 
occurrance of the hazardous event. Often this value is obtained from the HAZOP 
study. Reference from literature also will be a good source of valid range of initiating 
event frequency. Method in determining the numerical  value for the initiating event 
is out of scope for this project. Thus the tool will simply ask user to key in the 
initiating event frequency regardless how the user obtain the value. Nevertheless, in a 
full integrated tool development, this value is expected to be obtained from wide 
database and company history or record. 
 
After the frequency of the initiating event is inserted. The proposed tool is expected 
to transform the data into index value which is the relative order of range of 
frequency in simplify form. Table 3.2 below is an example of relative relationship 
between initiating event frequency and frequency index. 
 
Table 3.2: Proposed relationship of initiating event frequency and initiating index 
frequency 
Range of IE frequency (year
-1
) Initiating Frequency Index (Fi) 
0.1 – 0.01 6 
0.01 – 0.001 5 
0.001 – 0.0001 4 
0.0001 – 0.00001 3 




Figure 3.2: Initiating index value (automatically transformed by the proposed tool) 
 
Figure 3.2 demonstrate the index value for both “Consequence Severity” and 
“Initiating Event Frequency”. Please note the value “4” is obtained from “Major” in 
Table 3.1 and value of “6” for Fi is obtained from Table 3.2 
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3.1.3. Identify the applicable independent protection layers and evaluate their 
effectiveness 
 
After the severity of consequence and the frequency of the initiating event are 
specified, the tool must be able to evaluate the performance of the current protection 
provided by the independent protective layers. The purpose of this step is to identify 
the actual frequency of the hazardous event considering the protection by the existing 
safety layers. The tool is expected to transform the proabability of failure on demand 
(PFD) into probability of failure on demand index (Spfd) as published in CCPS as in 
Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Probability of Failure on demand indexes (CCPS, 2001) 
Probability of failure on 
demand index (Spfd) 
Probability range Expected failure based on 
1000 demand 
0 1 > 10000 
1 1 to 10-1 100 to 1000 
2 10-1 to 10-2 10 to 100 
3 10-2 to 10-3 1 to 10 
4 10-3 to 10-4 0.1 to 1 
5 10-4 to 10-5 0.01 to 0.1 
 
This index value is easier to be manage and can be used in the next step in 
determining the reduced frequency. 
 
3.1.3. Calculate the expected frequency for the hazardous event 
 
Campa and Cruz-Gomez (2009) proposed that the frequency of hazardous event must 
take into account the number of existing protection layers. This protective layers 
would reduce the initiating index frequency by considering the effectiveness of all 
the existing protection layers. This true frequency or Reduced Frequency (Fr) is 





Fr  = Fi – ES -----------------------------------------------------------------------Equation 1 
 
Where: 
Fr = Frequency reduction 
Fi = Initiating index frequency 
ES = Effectiveness of protection 
 
3.1.5. Determine the need for additional layers of protection and the required 
SIL if SIS is recommended. 
 
With the reduced frequency (Fr) obtained, the tool will make a comparison with the 
threshold frequency (Ft) of the selected scenario. If the the reduced frequency is 
lower than treshold frequency (Fr < Ft), no additional protection layers are required. 
However, if the value is higher than threshold frequency, next step will follows. 
 
3.1.6. Determination of required SIL 
 
Finally, the determination of the required safety integiry level (SIL) is carried out by 
the quantification of the Sadd value, which is calculated as the difference between 
reduced frequency and threshold frequency. Relation to SIL required is suggested by 
CCPS as follows: 
 
Table 3.4: Determination of required SIL from Sadd number (CCPS, 2001) 
Sadd Required SIL PFD Range 
4 3 10
-3
 – 10-4 
3 2 10
-2
 – 10-3 
2 1 10
-1











3.1.6.1 Comment and suggestion (qualitative judgement) 
 
This tool also expected to provide early suggestion to the user regarding the SIL of 
the SIS. A qualitative suggestion that can be deduced from the value available is 
suggested by Campa and Cruz-Gomez (2009) as Table 3.5 below: 
 
Table 3.5: Comment and suggestion for each condition (Campa, 2009) 
Condition Comment 
Fr  ≤ Ft Protection are sufficient for risk scenario (if Fr << Ft, then there 
is over design according to the acceptability criteria) 
Fr ≥ Ft The protection are insufficient for the risk scenario (the 
combined IPLs effectiveness are not enough to reduce the 
initiating event frequency to the maximum accepTable 
frequency for the scenario. Need to establish a risk control 
strategy based on the required effectiveness. Frequency 
reduction, SADD = Fr - Ft. 
 
Case 1: SADD ≤ 1 
If we already have IPLs , we need to recommend improving the 
effectiveness of these layers (more frequent and systematized 
maintenance program, enhance operators response to alarms by 
training / emergency drill. 
  
If there are no IPL applicable, need to recommend installing a 
non-SIS PL. Only if no non-SIS layers can be applied, we could 
suggest using a SIS with SIL 1. 
 
Case 2: 2 ≤ SADD ≤ 4 
Non-SIS protection layers and existing protection layer 
improvement must be suggested if possible and reevaluated to 
determine if this is enough. If no non- SIS protection layers can 
be suggested and existing protection have been improved, we 
can suggest installing a SIS. 
 
Case 3: SADD ≥ 4 
The value of SADD is very high and a SIS protection would 
not be enough to mitigate the risk. Therefore reevaluation of the 
equipment or process searching for a high effectiveness 
solutions and second, implement several SIS and non-SIS 
protection layers until the risk is at accepTable level. 
 
If a SIS is recommended, the required SIL can be determined 
from the SADD value after considering the other non-SIS 





3.2. Tool Development 
 
In order to develop the tool required in this project, the flow for the function of the 
tool must be first develop. The tool is expected to: 
 
1. Receiving initial inputs namely: Consequence Severity, Initiating Event 
Frequency and Probability of Failure on Demands (PFD) for the existing 
protective layers. 
2. Compute the effectiveness of the existing protective layer and hence the 
amount of risk reduction achieved. 
3. Determine whether the current protection layer is sufficient or insufficient 





Figure 3.3: Flow chart for the proposed tool 
Convert PFD to 
PFD index, Spfd 
Check with 
PHA team 





Input consequence severity 
Convert severity into threshold 
frequency index, Ft 
Input IE frequency 
Convert IE frequency into 
index value, Fi 
PFD of IPLs known? 
Yes No 
Yes No 
𝐸𝑆 = 𝑆𝑝𝑓𝑑 
Calculate ES, 
𝐹𝑟 = 𝐹𝑖 − 𝐸𝑆 
Calculate Fr, 






𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 𝐹𝑟 − 𝐹𝑡 
Calculate Sadd, 




















4.1.1 Case 1: Hexane Storage Tank (Cui et al, 2012) 
Case text 
 
The Hexane Storage Tank example from the CCPS‟s LOPA guidance book is used here 
to illustrate how LOPA evaluation is being done. Hexane prior process (not shown) 
flows continuously into the surge tank under applied pressure. The level is controlled by 
a level control loop (LIC-90) that measure and throttles a level valve (LV-90) to a set 
value.The LIC control loop includes a high level alarm (LAH-90) to alert the operator. 
Note: Tank is located in a dike with 1.5 tank capacity (120, 000 lbs) 
 
Table 4.1: Information available after HAZOP (study node: T-401, deviation: High 
level) 
Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation 
Low control valve 
transfer or fails 
open 
High pressure in 
surge tank 
Relieve valve – 
discharges to dike 
 
 Loss of containment 
(if the overpressure 
exceeds the tank 
pressure rating) 
  
 Release of Hexane, 
fire hazard affecting 
large area, exceed 
the capacity of dike 
Emergency 
responce procedure 
Consider to install 
SIS 







Figure 4.1: Case study node (CCPS, 2001) 
 
Table 4.2: Input data available to continue for LOPA (Cui et al) 
Consequence under study (Severity) Release of Hexane, fire hazard 
(Catastrophy) 
Initiating event (frequency) BPCS LIC failure (1 x 10
-1
) 
Tolerable Risk 1 x 10
-5 
Independence Protective Layer 







Figure 4.2: Computed result for Case 1 
 
The sequence severity is assigned as Major which will depend on size of release and 
consequence on production and facility. Initial event frequency is assigned 0.1 for BPCS 
instrument loop failure. Corresponding index frequency is denoted as 6 for 0.1 
likelihood per year or one occurrence every ten years. 
 
In this scenario, emergency response procedure cannot be included as an IPL as the 
initiating event is BPCS which will trigger the alarm for human response. Threshold 
frequency is assigned by tolerable risk accepted by the organisation. From the program, 
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no additional protection is required as the reduced frequency with available IPL is same 
as threshold frequency. However, if the size of release is significantly bigger, the 
consequence may fall to Catastrophe with threshold frequency 3. In this case, Sadd 1 will 
be obtained which signify an additional protective layer is required. Campa and Cruz-
Gomez suggested that for Sadd smaller or equal to 1, a non-SIS can be recommended or 
if possible simply improving the current protective layers with regular reliability 
maintenance to increase the Spfd of the layers. 
 
This however deviate from result calculated by L. Cui et al. 
Figure 4.3: Comparison Analysis with other LOPA tools (Cui et al) 
 
Cui, using HASILT system (using normal decimal instead of index) found that a SIF 
with requirement SIL 2 is required (maximum tolerable risk of 10
-5
 per year and 
frequency of mitigated event of 2.5 x 10
-4




It is found that results from both methods are contradicting. One of obvious parameter 
differentiate the result is the presence of conditional modifier in HASILT software by 
Cui. Conditional modifier is not necessary compulsory, however the risk under 
investigation for Cui method is risk towards harmful to personal or society. Meanwhile, 
the developed method only investigates the risk of the hazardous process. Thus 
including conditional modifier as an option in the tool is a valid argument since the 





4.1.2. Case 2: Buncefield Incident, 2005 
Case text 
 
A two tanks storing a flammable substance, with properties similar to those of petrol. 
The tanks are filled from a main processing plant via a pipeline. Tank gauging and 
overfill protection are provided by Automatic Tank Gauge (ATG) and operator 
response; the operator is able to initiate a manually emergency shutdown (ESD) from the 
control room. Magnetically coupled float switches are used to initiate automatic closure 
of relevant plant valves. Loss of level signal, plant control valve signal or loss of air 
automatically closes the relevant plant valves. 
 
Table 4.3: Input data available (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2009) 
Consequence under study (Severity) Series of explosion, Catastrophe 
Initiating event (frequency) ATG failure (0.5) 




Manual ESD 0.40 
ATG Alarms 0.30 





Figure 4.4: Computed results for case 2 
 
 
The second case is base on “Buncefield incident” where a series of explosion occurred 
where the main cause is the fuel storage tank overfills. The input for the LOPA 
procedure is obtained from a consultant report on the incident as requested by 
Buncefield Standard Task Group (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2009). The severity of 
the consequence is very high due to multiple explosions involved, therefore a 
“Catastrophe” category is well justified in this case. On the other hand, the ATG failure 
is assumed that it fails once every two years (0.5 per year) which indicate weak 
reliability of the ATG as the initiating event (common value is 0.1 per year). From Table 
3.2, the frequency index relative to the value will be 6. 
 
Next, from the lists of protective layers available, Automatic Tank Gauge (ATG) alarm 
and manual Emergency Shudtdown (ESD) fail to meet the “independence” criteria as 
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outlined by CCPS. Therefore, only trip valve qualify to provide risk reduction towards 
the initiating risk. From computed data, the reduced frequency index is still bigger than 
threshold frequency index and therefore additional protection is suggested. 
 
From Sadd value obtained, recommendation from Champa and Cruz-Gomez can be used 
for early risk control strategy. Therefore, this tool suggests installing SIS with SIL 1 for 
the process system. Table below show summary other LOPA done on the same case by 
various consultants for Buncefield Incident. 
 





Target SIL (Value 
if stated) 
Calculated SIL Gap 
1 1 x 10
-6
 No SIL 
recommended 
No Shortfall 
2 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 1.08 x 10
-1
 
3 1 x 10
-5
 No SIL 
recommended 
No Shortfall 
4 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 7.65 x 10
-2
 
5 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 4.74 x 10
-1
 
6 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 6.24 x 10
-1
 
7 1 x 10
-5
 SIL 2 1.34 x 10
-2
 
8 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 





9 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 3.43 x 10
-2
 
10 1 x 10
-6
 No SIL 
recommended 
No Shortfall 
11 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 2.25 x 10
-1
 
12 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 1.09 x 10
-2
 
13 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 2.91 x 10
-1
 
14 1 x 10
-6
 SIL 2 7.21 x 10
-3
 
15 1 x 10
-6




Please note that the tool developed re-evaluate LOPA presented by Company ID 8. The 
company initially does not recommend SIS. A revision was made after the initial report 
submission recommending SIS of SIL 2. The “Corporate Risk Criteria” refer to the 
threshold frequency, where 1 x 10
-6





The main concern is the final recommendation from various LOPA study. Most of the 
LOPA consultants recommend SIL 2 for this case while the current proposed tool 
recommend SIL 1. The main different between the studies are that the definition of IPLs 
and value stated vary widely. Since the input for the tool is taken from Company ID 8 
which initially does not recommend additional SIL, some of the PFD of IPLs may be 
revised. Nevertheless, unavailability of process flow diagram for the case under study 
limits identification of IPLs. The final recommendation by Health and Safety Laboratory 
for this incident is SIL 2 while the proposed tool only recommends SIL 1. Further study 
can be done to improve the result by using sensitivity analysis so that the main factor 





4.1.3. Case 3: Failure of level transmitter (LT) indicating a false high level in a high 
pressure sour gas amine treatment unit (Campa and Cruz-Gomez, 2009) 
Case text 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the simplified process flow of the absorber section of a high pressure 
sour gas amine treatment unit. Sour gas is a natural gas containing hydrogen sulphide 
(H2S). Lean amine is used to remove H2S in absorber column, T-1. Based on HAZOP 
study of the process as shown in Table 4.5, the following scenario is selected (Node: 
High pressure amine absorber (T-1) and Deviation: high level) 
 
Figure 4.5: Process flow diagram of absorber section of sour gas treatment unit (Campa 




From the study node identified, HAZOP study of the process is summarise as follows: 
 
Table 4.5: Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) study of the process 
Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendations 
Failure of LT 
indicating a false 
high alarm 
LV fully opens, loss 
of liquid seal in T-1 
column (LG 
indication is 
unreliable in this 
case) 
High pressure 
alarm in V-1, PIC 
and operator 
responce 
Consider adding a 
SIS and implement a 
SIF for this scenario 
 High pressure gas 
flows to low 
pressure flash tank 
V-1 (not designed 
for this scenario) 
 Lock LV bypass 
valve in closed 
position 
 LV bypass valve 
could erroneously 
opened in an 
attempt to control 
the „high level‟ in t-
1, worsening the 
scenario 
 Update emergency 
operation procedures 
with this scenario and 
train operator 
accordingly 




Table 4.6: Extracted information available for LOPA 
Consequence Description/ Category Assuming facility spacing is adequate. 
Personal concentrated in bunker control 
room at sufficient distance. 
Category 4: Major 
Initiating event frequency Failure of a level transmitter indicating 
false high level (0.1) 
Independent Protection Layers  
1. BPCS alarms and Human Action 1 x 10-1 
2. Level Gauge (LG) Cannot be considered independent since 
LG is part of IE 






Figure 4.6: Computed results for case 3 
 
The consequence severity is assigned as major and low initiating event frequency of 0.1. 
Initiating event denoted give a high probability of occurrence and therefore 
corresponding index frequency of 6 is denoted. 
 
Only one of the PLs available meets the “independence” criteria which is the process 
alarm. Due to only one IPL, low reduced frequency is obtained and therefore resulted in 
insufficient protection. Therefore, it is important to view the risk control strategy for the 
process. 
 
In this case, Campa and Cruz-Gomes recommendation is displayed as presented below 




 If IPLs already exist, improve the protection layers (more frequent and 
systemised maintenance program, enhance operator response to alarms by 
training or emergency shutdown. 
 If there are no IPL applicable, need to recommend installing a non-SIS 
Protection Layer. 
 Only if no non-SIS layers can be applied, suggesting on using a SIS with SIL 
1. 
 
As a comparison with another analysis made on the same scenario (Fakhirin, 2010), it is 
found that the result of the proposed tool is similar to Interlock by Fakhirin. The system 
is therefore can be concluded as not sufficiently protected. Improvement on the existing 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
In the conclusion, the proposed tool managed to provide a framework to assist LOPA 
analyst evaluate a scenario with standard method. The idea is that within the same 
organisation, the employee (LOPA analyst) may retire thus carry the knowledge with 
them. This proposed tool provides a mean of knowledge transfer and consistency for the 
organisation and therefore promotes safety any of their facilities. Prior determination of 
SIL using LOPA, the protective layers (PLs) play the most important role. It is important 
to understand the concept of independence of the PL before it can qualify to be 
considered as an independent protective layer (IPL). Among the main rules outlined by 
CCPS is the importance of maintaining, testing and record-keeping for each IPL. This 
routine basically provides a better source of information especially the probability of 
failure on demand (PFD) of IPL before proceeding with the LOPA. Moreover, the PFD 
is also justified with proper documentation thus give a more accurate LOPA result. 
Another importance of the proposed tool is that as suggested by Bridges (2009), LOPA 
analyst must be separated from process hazard analysis team (PHA) to prevent 
distracting the PHA team in brainstorming for every possible situation. A sole analyst is 
often quote as sufficient to do LOPA and a spreadsheet framework is highly 
recommended to assist the analyst. Future study shall include a statistical analysis and 
sensitivity analysis which provide a clear indication on the best course of action that 
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